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Y et both developed and
developing countries may have
another reason to protect
intellectual property—
preserving product effectiveness.
In the Uruguay round of multilateral trade
negotiations, industrialized nations focused on
using the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) to increase the protection of intel-
lectual property rights in developing countries.
Representatives of developed countries have
long claimed that the protection of intellectual
property in developing countries raises welfare
for all parties (Vishwasrao 1994). In contrast,
recent theoretical literature (Chin and Grossman
1988, Diwan and Rodrik 1991, Deardorff 1992,
and Helpman 1993) argues that in an invention-
importing country, where domestic invention is
scarce or nonexistent, the protection of intellec-
tual property can reduce the country’s welfare
and, in some cases, world welfare.
An important assumption of this literature
is that the only return to society from protecting
intellectual property is that it stimulates in-
ventors to invent. In the developing world,
however, human capital is assumed to be insuf-
ficient to produce many inventions. In addition,
markets in the industrialized countries can be
large enough that offering protection for intel-
lectual property in developing countries adds
little incentive for invention in the industrialized
world.
1 Therefore, intellectual property protec-
tion is likely to imply monopoly costs to 
consumers in developing countries, without
providing much stimulus for either local or 
foreign invention.
2 Using this approach, Nogués
(1993) contributes empirical evidence that
patent protection for pharmaceuticals can
reduce welfare in developing countries.
Yet both developed and developing 
countries may have another reason to protect
intellectual property—preserving product effec-
tiveness. This reason for protection has not
been addressed in previous literature. For a
wide range of products, such as antibiotics,
fungicides, herbicides, and pesticides, effective-
ness diminishes with cumulative use. Ironically,
such products have been among the least likely
to receive intellectual property protection in
nonindustrial countries (Butler 1990). Further-
more, developed countries generally let the pro-
tection of intellectual property rights for all
products expire after a set period. Neither
course is optimal.
To highlight the importance of preserving
product effectiveness, we present a model in
which the entire world shares a characteristic
that most analysts ascribe only to developing
countries: invention is not motivated by finan-
cial gain. Invention is costlessly bestowed
through divine intervention, pure altruism, or
dumb luck. Nonetheless, we show that protec-16
tion of intellectual property remains necessary
to optimize social welfare.
In the model, the absence of intellectual
property protection permits a competitive 
market to develop for a product whose effec-
tiveness diminishes with cumulative use. The
deterioration of product effectiveness yields an
externality cost that neither consumers nor pro-
ducers take into account. As a consequence,
product effectiveness is depleted at a faster than
optimal rate, as resistant strains of bacteria,
fungi, weeds, and pests develop.
In contrast, a monopoly producer, who
owns the intellectual property right to such a
product, has an economic incentive to preserve
product effectiveness. The monopolist takes
into account how one individual’s use affects
future effectiveness and consequent product
demand. In doing so, the monopolist internal-
izes the externality and acts to preserve the
product’s effectiveness for future use. These
findings have important implications for do-
mestic patent protection, as well as for trade
negotiations, which increasingly involve intel-
lectual property rights.
An analytical model
The model characterizes the market for a
product whose effectiveness diminishes with
cumulative use. Invention is costlessly bestowed
under two types of policy regimes: one without
intellectual property protection and one with it.
In the regime without intellectual property pro-
tection, all producers have equal claim on the
invention, and they produce in a competitive
market. In the regime with intellectual property
protection, the invention is bestowed on a 
single producer, who gains a monopoly.
We begin by presenting demand and sup-
ply conditions for the product. We next develop
the social-welfare-maximizing conditions for the
market. We then compare these optimality con-
ditions with the conditions that would prevail in
a competitive market (with no intellectual prop-
erty protection) and a monopolized market
(with intellectual property protection). Finally,
we conclude by comparing the competitive and
monopolistic cases.
Demand. The quantity demanded at any
moment in time (Qt) is a function of price (Pt)
and product effectiveness (Et):
(1) Qt = Q(Pt,Et),
where ¶Qt/¶Pt < 0 and ¶Qt/¶Et > 0.
3
Natural selection drives the process by
which antibiotics, fungicides, herbicides, and
pesticides lose effectiveness through cumulative
use. Effective use of such a product can destroy
all or most of the target population of bacteria,
fungus, weeds, or pests in a given ecological
niche. In some cases, small numbers of the tar-
get population survive; these are strains that are
resistant to the product in use. With the ecolog-
ical niche cleared of competing members of the
target population, resistant strains multiply and
fill the niche. Eventually, resistant strains take
over the niche and spread to other environ-
ments. As this happens, the antibiotic, fungi-
cide, herbicide, or pesticide in use loses its
effectiveness. Low-value uses accelerate the
process in which a product loses effectiveness.
We simplify the process by assuming that
product effectiveness at any moment in time is
a decreasing function of cumulative consump-
tion to date, Xt:
(2) Et = E(Xt),
where ¶Et/¶Xt < 0.
At any moment in time, cumulative con-




where t is a dummy of integration for t (time),
and Qt is the time derivative (rate of change) 
of Xt.
For analytical convenience, we rewrite
demand as an inverse function, incorporating
E(Xt) in place of Et:
(3) Pt = D(Qt, Xt),
where ¶Pt/¶Qt < 0, and ¶Pt/¶Xt < 0.
Supply. Production occurs in n identical
plants so the total quantity produced at any time
(Qt) is the number of plants (n) times the quan-
tity produced in each plant (q):
(4) Qt = nqt.
For an individual plant, the total cost of
production (c) is a function of output (q):
(5) ct = c(qt),
where marginal cost is positive—that is, ¶c/¶q
> 0. If output is distributed efficiently across all 
n plants, the aggregate total cost of produc-
tion (Ct) can be written as a function of either
Q or q:
4
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Social welfare maximization. The opti-
mality conditions for social welfare maximi-
zation serve as a benchmark against which
competition and monopoly can be compared.
Social welfare is the present discounted value of
the sum of consumer and producer surplus,
evaluated over time:





0 [D(c, X ) – Cc) ¶c¶t,
where r is the interest rate, c is a dummy of
integration for quantity (Q), and Cc is defined
as ¶C/¶c. (To simplify notation, we drop the
time subscript; it is implicit.)
Pontryagin’s maximum principle (and some
manipulation) yields the optimality condition
for social welfare maximization:
(8) P = CQ + l.
Price (P) equals marginal cost (CQ) plus a user
cost (l).
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The user cost represents the marginal
value of preserving effectiveness for future peri-
ods as follows:





where PX is defined as ¶P/¶X. If cumulative use
reduces effectiveness, the price consumers are
willing to pay for the product falls with cumu-
lative production, PX < 0, and the user cost is
positive. If cumulative consumption does not
alter effectiveness, then PX = 0, the user cost is
zero, and equation 8 becomes the familiar opti-
mality condition in which price equals marginal
cost.
The optimality conditions also indicate
that the user cost can increase or decrease in
value over time. In particular,
(10) l
×
= r l + PX,
which, given that PX < 0, indicates that the user
cost grows more slowly than the interest rate
and declines if PX is sufficiently negative.
The optimality condition expressed in
equation 8 serves as a benchmark against which
we compare the competitive and monopolistic
cases.
Competitive case. In a purely competitive
case, product effectiveness influences demand,
but individual consumers and producers ignore
the effect that individual consumption has on
future effectiveness.
In the competitive case, inverse demand
remains
(11) P = D(Q,X).
For each firm, profit-maximizing condi-
tions are obtained at the output where the firm’s
marginal cost equals the market price:
(12) P = cq.
With  n identical firms, market-clearing con-
ditions require that the quantity demanded 
(Q) equals the total quantity produced (n •q) at
the market-clearing price (P). Given the cost
function, equation 6, and Q = nq, it can be
shown that CQ equals cq. Therefore, competi-
tion yields the familiar case in which price
equals marginal cost:
(13) P = CQ.
This familiar case is not optimal, however.
With consumers and producers ignoring the
externality effects that consumption has on
future effectiveness, the user cost found in
equation 8 does not arise. Figure 1 illustrates the
effect for a given demand curve at any moment
in time. P* and Q* are the socially optimal price
and quantity, respectively. For the given
demand curve, the competitive market will yield
a lower price, PC, and a higher quantity, QC,
than is socially optimal.
Comparing the dynamics of the competi-
tive case with those of the socially optimal case
is more complicated. Because the competitive
market produces above the socially optimal
rate, the demand curve shifts inward more
rapidly than in the optimal case. At some point
in time, demand in the competitive case will
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Q, will be lower than if use of the product had
always been optimal. This condition continues
thereafter until product effectiveness goes to
zero. Nevertheless, on the competitive time
path, the cumulative consumption to date, X,
will always be greater and the price will be
lower than on the socially optimal time path.
Although intellectual property protection
optimizes social welfare, the no-protection,
competitive case can be made socially optimal
by imposing a tax equal to the user cost or 
by identifying and banning low-value uses. The
trouble with these solutions is that political time
horizons and pressures may render political
actors unwilling or unable to optimally defer
product use either through higher prices or by
proscribing low-value uses.
Monopolistic case. In the monopolistic
case, the single seller has an incentive to con-
sider how current consumption affects future
effectiveness because the loss in effectiveness
will be reflected in future sales. At the same
time, however, a monopolist has the incentive
to earn monopolistic rents by restricting output.
The monopolist’s profit is described as
(14) P = ò
¥
0 e
–rt[P (Q, X )•Q – C(Q)] ¶t.
Pontryagin’s maximum principle (and
some manipulation) yields the monopolist’s
profit-maximizing condition as
(15) P + PQ
•Q = CQ + l.
Marginal revenue (P + PQQ) equals marginal
cost  (CQ) plus the user cost (l), where PQ is the
reduction in price required to sell the marginal
unit. Equations 9 and 10 describe the user cost.
The presence of the user cost in equation
15 shows that the monopolist takes into account
how current consumption affects future effec-
tiveness. At the same time, however, the
monopolist restricts output to obtain a mo-
nopoly rent. Figure 1 illustrates monopolistic
behavior for a given demand curve at any
moment in time. P* and Q* remain the socially
optimal price and quantity, respectively. For the
given demand curve, the monopolist sets a
higher price, PM, and sells a smaller quantity,
QM, than is optimal. (The monopolist obtains a
marginal revenue of MRM.)
Comparing the dynamics of the monopo-
listic case with those of the socially optimal one
is more complicated. Because the monopolist
produces below the socially optimal rate, the
demand curve shifts inward less rapidly than in
the optimal case. At some point in time,
demand in the monopolistic case will have
shifted inward enough less that output, Q, will
be higher than if use of the product had always
been managed in a socially optimal fashion.
This condition will be maintained thereafter
until product effectiveness goes to zero. Never-
theless, on the monopolistic time path, cumula-
tive consumption to date, X, will always be
lower and the price will always be higher than
on the socially optimal time path.
One way to encourage the monopolist 
to allocate the product in a socially optimal
manner is to establish a government-mandated
price path in which the market-clearing price in
each period is set equal to marginal cost plus
user cost. With a set price path, the monopolist
faces a perfectly elastic demand, and the incen-
tive to restrict output disappears. Setting such 
a price path requires considerable informa-
tion about demand and true production costs.
In addition, such a policy could be rife with
political influence because the monopolist
would have an incentive to lobby government
officials to raise the regulated price above the
optimal level.
A more politic approach is to offer the
monopolist a production subsidy equal to –PQQ.
The government can avoid making a transfer to
the monopolist by auctioning off permanent
rights to monopolize the product’s market with
the government subsidy in place. Under com-
petitive bidding, the monopoly rents and subsi-
dies would be recaptured by the government.
This policy can solve the allocation problem
only if the government commitment to honor
the contract is credible. We do not address time
inconsistency problems here.
Conclusion: Competition versus monopoly
As shown above, neither competition nor
monopoly is consistent with social welfare 
maximization when a product’s effectiveness
declines with cumulative use. A competitive
industry would charge too low a price and
deplete the product’s effectiveness too rapidly.
A monopolist would charge too high a price
and produce too little of the product.
Our results are broadly consistent with
those of Chin and Grossman, Diwan and
Rodrik, Deardorff, and Helpman. They find that
a competitive industry would provide too little
invention, and a monopoly too little output, to
maximize social welfare. But in their analyses,
competition is preferable to monopoly when
the welfare cost of the lost stimulus to invent is
less than the welfare cost of restricted output.
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to monopoly when the welfare cost of failing to
protect product effectiveness is less than the
welfare cost of restricted output. Monopoly is
preferable to competition when the welfare cost
of failing to protect product effectiveness is
more than the welfare cost of restricted output.
We are unable to put prior values on these costs
other than to say they depend on the elasticity
of demand and the rate at which product effec-
tiveness is depleted through cumulative use. In
some cases, a monopoly that protects intellec-
tual property may be preferable to competition,
even when invention is costlessly provided.
If we simultaneously consider both the
incentive to invent and the depletion of product
effectiveness, competition will result in too little
invention and too rapid depletion of product
effectiveness. A monopolist will produce too 
little of the product.
6 In addition, Vishwasrao
shows that the gains to developed countries in
avoiding monopoly pricing through patent
infringement may be limited.
7 As a conse-
quence, the case for protecting intellectual
property rights is substantially stronger for 
products whose effectiveness is depleted with
cumulative use. Products with this characteristic
—antibiotics, fungicides, herbicides, and pesti-
cides—have been among the least likely to
receive patent protection in developing countries.
Notes
The authors would like to thank Zsolt Becsi, Alan V.
Deardorff, Evan Koenig, Roy Ruffin, and Carlos Zara-
zaga for helpful comments on earlier drafts, without
implicating them in any shortcomings of the analysis.
1 Taylor (1994) underscores the importance of incentives
by showing that an invention-importing country can
slow technological progress and make both itself and
the world worse off when its failure to protect intellec-
tual property developed elsewhere reduces the incen-
tive to invent elsewhere.
2 Diwan and Rodrik (1991) and Frischstak (1990) find
that developing countries can improve their welfare by
protecting intellectual property when they have a
strong demand for a product that is not particularly
useful in industrialized countries.
3 Over some ranges of effectiveness, consumers may
increase their use of an antibiotic, fungicide, herbicide,
or pesticide to offset reduced effectiveness. We
abstract from this case by assuming that they would
do so only at a reduced price. Therefore, at a given
price, consumption falls with effectiveness.
4 For simplicity, we assume the same number of plants
in all three cases. This assumption simplifies the analy-
sis without affecting the results.
5 This optimality condition should be familiar to those
who are versed in the economics of exhaustible nat-
ural resources. See Dasgupta and Heal (1979).
6 The monopolist’s incentive to restrict output may be
limited, however, by the potential entry of competing
inventions. The extent of competition may depend on
the breadth of patent protection and the cost of imita-
tion. See Baumol and Willig (1981), Baumol, Panzar,
and Willig (1988), Gallini (1992), Gilbert and Shapiro
(1990), and Klemperer (1990).
7 Vishwasrao shows that a lack of patent protection can
adversely affect the licensing of low-cost technologies
to developing countries and that strategic behavior on
the part of firms in developed countries can erode the
gains developing countries reap through patent
infringement.
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